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Presenting a hard-to-predict typography-varying system predicated on Nazi-era cryptography,
the Enigma cipher machine, this paper illustrates conditions under which unrepeatable
phenomena can arise, even from straight-forward mechanisms. Such conditions arise where
systems are observed from outside of boundaries that arise through their observation, and
where such systems refer to themselves in a circular fashion. It argues that the Enigma cipher
machine is isomorphous with Heinz von Foersters portrayals of non-triviality in his non-trivial
machine (NTM), but not with surprising human behaviour, and it demonstrates that the NTM
does not account for spontaneity as it is observed in humans in general.
& 2014. Higher Education Press Limited Company. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Background
From the inside, it can be challenging to determine the
scope, shape and development of the ﬁeld one is
operating in. Are the frontiers of architectural design
research static, unvarying limits? Or are the frontiers of
architectural design research changing borderlines,
shifting according to modes, depths and directions of
enquiry? To what extent do its design and research
aspects overlap, and to what extent are design and
research comparable or compatible? Do design and
research have enough in common to be approached as
equals, rendering insights into one of them applicable.06.003
ress Limited Company. Productio
Southeast University.to the respective other? Are they viable models or
metaphors for one another, or are they too different
to allow such analogies between them? Answers to these
questions, of course, depend much on what is meant by
design and by research.
Understandings of design and research, of their methods,
tools and standards, diverge considerably in different con-
texts. The argument presented here addresses design,
design tools and research methods in reference to systemic
boundaries and circular re-entry, and with regards to the
notion of determinability in order to shine a critical light
on those instances where design and design research are
approached in terms of purely linear cause and effect. It is
shown that conceptualisations of design (research) in terms
of (natural-scientiﬁc or computational) linear causality may
be unduly limited.n and hosting by Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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ing human mind and a mechanical (cipher) machine. This
is not to say that the mind is like a mechanism, or that
mechanisms can act in the ways human minds do. The point
made is merely that minds and some mechanisms are
characterised by circular re-entry, which, in both cases,
leads to indeterminable behaviour, i.e. novelty. Neither
circular causality nor indeterminism, however, is recognised
by natural-scientiﬁc reasoning.Figure 2 Trivial machine with truth table (left) and non-trivial
machine (right), reproduced from Von Foerster (2003, pp. 310–311).2. System boundaries, input, output
and re-entry
Computer-aided architectural designing is an endeavour in
which the boundaries of systems are crossed. “System” is
understood here as whatever set of elements an observer
considers to act together, following a common goal. An
observer may choose to regard the components that make
up a computer as a system. Similarly, an observer may
choose to regard the organs making up the organism of a
designer as a system, or consider the designer and the
computer together as a system. With these different ways of
looking (Weinberg, 2001), the imaginary boundary that
circumscribes what is regarded as a system changes, and
what is considered as a system lies in the eyes of the
observer. Sometimes there are physical boundaries contain-
ing what is regarded as a system, such as the skin of a
designer and the case of a computer but this is coincidental.
Designer and computer together may be regarded as one
system contained by an imaginary, but without a physical
boundary. Patterns in the widest sense crossing the imagin-
ary boundaries of systems are, depending on perceived
direction, called inputs and outputs.
A common example of systems whose boundaries are
crossed by incoming inputs and by outgoing outputs is the
behaviourist-type stimulus-response structure of the kind
shown on the left-hand sides of Figures 1 and 2. This
structure offers convenience in modelling various systemic
relationships not only by way of abstraction and of being
broadly applicable. It is also conveniently compatible with
common basic tools of rational modern thought such as
linear logic and syllogistic reasoning. Humans are frequently
described as systems which, prompted by input, produce
output. And, typically, so are computers. Alternatively,
although this happens less frequently, an observer may also
choose to view multiple systems (inter)acting together as
one system which responds to input by producing output.
Human–computer interaction in CAAD may be viewed in thisFigure 1 Human viewed as a linear stimulus–response system
(left) and with the acknowledgement of circular self-reference
(right).way, along the lines of the following statement by Bateson
(1972, p. 317): “The computer is only an arc of a larger
circuit which always includes a man and an environment
from which information is received and upon which efferent
messages from the computer have effect.” Other examples
in the design context include the interactions between
members of a design team, and the interaction between a
designer and his or her sketching (Fischer, 2010, p. 612).
Any of these systems – human, computer, human–human,
human–computer and so on – is deﬁned by an imaginary
boundary projected by an observer. This imaginary boundary
sets the system's interior apart from its exterior. If a human
considers herself or himself as a system, then making
(the interior self-affecting the exterior other) and learning
(the exterior other affecting the interior self) constitute
instances of outputs and inputs crossing boundaries. While
cyclical relationships such as the ones observable in human–
computer interaction are commonly dissected and broken
up into pieces, it is uncommon to turn systems back on
themselves to form closed loops. This is because modern
culture appreciates systems which allow description in
terms of linearly-causal logic and which offer predictable
control in terms of deﬁned states. Closed loop structures
tend to be appreciated only where they facilitate control,
typically in the form of negative feedback and error
correction or of stable oscillation. Unpredictable ﬂuctua-
tions and out-of-control patterns tend to be unwelcome
outside of artistic and experimental domains. They are
rarely the subject of formal analysis, and attempts at their
formal analysis are hampered by the linear nature of
common tools of description. Nonetheless, the (designing)
human mind must be acknowledged not merely as a static
stimulus-response system, as a static translator between
inputs and outputs, but as a system whose input channels
are subjected to its own output. Contrary to the technol-
ogies it currently tends to develop, the human mind is
subjected to what it itself produces and is thus changed by
its own performance (see Figure 1).
As stated above, design, being at least in part out-of-
control (Glanville, 2000), involves not only linear but also
circular causality – between design team members, between
designers and their sketches etc. (Fischer, 2010). Common
algorithmic devices for generative, computer-based design
likewise involve circular feedback such as the potentially
circularly-causal relationship between any two cells in a
cellular automata system, or the self-referential relation-
ships in L-systems, in evolutionary algorithms and so on.
Input–output operations can leave traces inside of (design-
ing) systems equipped with suitable “internal state”
T. Fischer370memory. Such systems can therefore, in effect, become
different systems through each of their operations. And
through the interaction between input and/or output with
given internal states, such machines can behave unpredic-
tably. Systems of this kind will be explored and illustrated in
the following, with special attention to the limits of purely
mechanical or digital implementations in the design
context.
The loop which is formed when human articulations feed-
back as an input to the human creative process allows
expressions of the mind to re-enter into the mind where they
may leave increasingly stable traces (Glanville, 1997, p. 2), i.e.
memory. This view was substantiated in Von Foerster (1950)'s
interpretation of a previous study of human memory. In that
previous study subjects had been asked to memorise random,
meaningless syllables and to re-count as many of them as they
could afterwards at regular intervals. Memory and progressive
forgetting were shown to follow an exponential decay curve,
which did not approach zero, but a number of syllabi greater
than zero that the subjects were increasingly more likely to
remember permanently. Von Foerster explains this with the
human being capable of both input (listening) and output
(speaking), and hence circular closure and re-entry of articula-
tions. Thus, every re-counting of a remembered syllable (out-
put) is also a new input which reinforces what is known.
Repeated recalling thus leads to an eventually stable subset of
remembered syllables.
Von Foerster (2003, p. 311) illustrated processes of this
nature using his notion of the trivial machine (TM), which he
juxtaposed to his notion of the non-trivial machine (NTM).
Somewhat comparable to Turing's (1937, p. 231ff.) proposal of
the Turing Machine, von Foerster describes both the TM and the
NTM as minimal hypothetical machines not for the purpose of
implementation, but for the purpose of illustrating ideas. He
describes both TM and NTM as basic input–output (stimulus-
response) systems, each being a mechanism connected to
an input channel and an output channel. The TM predictably
translates inputs into corresponding outputs, so that an external
observer can, after a period of observation, establish clear
causal relationships between possible inputs and resulting
outputs, for example in the form of a “truth table” as shown
on the left of Figure 2. A complete truth table is a reliable
model for predicting the TM's output responses to given inputs,
irrespectively of how long the machine has been in operation.
In contrast, the NTM contains means to memorise a machine
state (labelled z on the right of Figure 2). This state
co-determines the machine's output together with its input.
At the same time, the state may change with each input–output
operation. This results in a vast number of possible input–output
mappings which can easily exceed the quantitative limits
of what an external observer can determine analytically, i.e.
derive predictive capabilities from Glanville (2003, p. 99).
The NTM's history of input–output translations can be said
to leave traces in the machine, which in effect turns into a
different machine through and for each of its own operations.
An outside observer cannot easily establish a reliable truth
table by which outputs resulting from given inputs can be
predicted.
Von Foerster's presentations of the NTM changed slightly
from presentation to presentation, in particular with
regards to that which brings about state changes in the
machine. According to Von Foerster (1970, p. 139) thetransitions of internal states depend on the machine's
previous state and on its input, according to Von Foerster
(1972, p. 6) internal state transitions depend on the
machine's previous output, and according to Von Foerster
(1984, p. 10) internal state transitions depend again on the
machine's previous state and on its input.
Another description of non-triviality offered by von
Foerster is the image of a schoolboy who displays non-
trivial behaviour by responding to a maths or history
problem with an unexpected answer. Similar to the mechan-
istic portrayal of non-triviality, the anthropomorphic por-
trayal changes slightly from one presentation to the next. In
Sander (1999) and Pruckner (2002) the schoolboy responds
to the problem “2 times 2” with the result “green”. In Von
Foerster (2003, p. 311) he responds to problem “2 times 3”
with the answer “green” or with the answer “Thats how old
I am”. In Von Foerster (1972, p. 6) he responds to the
question When was Napoleon born? with the answer “Seven
years before the Declaration of Independence.” Von Foer-
ster deplores the state of educational systems in which
school children who offer such unexpected responses are
deemed insufﬁciently trivialised, and therefore trained
more until they produce the desired answers reliably.
The distinction between the trivial and the non-trivial
behaviour deserves attention in general and in particular in
our ﬁeld because in every encounter the choice between both
metaphors determines much of the ethical stance one takes
towards others, tools, buildings etc. Virtually all of our science
and technology corresponds to the principle of the trivial
machine in the sense that a given input is expected to always
reliably lead to the same output. Multiple computers are, put
simply, expected to always have the same response in the face
of the same task or problem. Stereotypical engineers, managers
and representatives of other professions, be they allied with
architecture or not, are likewise expected to arrive at the same
results when presented with the same input. In the education
of these professions this aspiration to the ideal of the trivial
machine is enforced with the principle of scientiﬁc repeat-
ability. Multiple stereotypical engineers tasked with the same
structural analysis problem, or the same engineer tasked with
the same structural analysis problem twice should reliably
arrive at the same results, i.e. fulﬁl expectations predictably
and reliably. Brieﬁng multiple architectural designers with the
same project brief, in contrast, makes sense only if variety
among multiple responses is desired. Brieﬁng the same archi-
tectural designer with the same task twice will also lead to two
different outcomes because the second time around, one would
be facing a different architect one who was subjected to her/
his own ﬁrst design process and outcome, which left traces in
her/him and thus changed her/him. In this sense, and in the
sense of Heraclitus statement that “No man ever steps in the
same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the
same man”, one cannot design (or learn, for that matter) the
same thing twice.
Von Foerster explains convincingly that neither NTM nor
schoolboy permits analytical determination from the perspec-
tive of a human observer. He does not, however, address the
possible conclusion that NTM and unpredictable human are
therefore to be taken as isomorphous. He calls for humans to
be perceived as non-trivial (Von Foerster, 1972, p. 6), without
addressing the question of whether the NTM would be capable
of giving the answers given by the schoolboy.
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Surprising variety (in the cybernetic sense: number of choices
available) and reliable predictability are, paradoxically both
for better and for worse, essential human needs and human
characteristics (Fischer, 2010, p. 611). We experience this
paradox in numerous contexts in which we enjoy both
stimulating variety in expression as well as economic and
organisational beneﬁts of uniformity. In shaping our products
and environments, the advantages offered by predictably
uniform (hence interchangeable) prefabricated components
famously gave rise to assembly-line based production since
the early days of industrial production; and it is part and
parcel of architectural construction today. Having been
introduced to architecture with uniform building elements,
prefabrication brought along with it sameness at the scales of
component repetition. At small scales of component repeti-
tion, such as that of clay bricks (Fischer, 2007), interchange-
ability may be appreciated for allowing ﬂexibility and subtle
texture. At larger scales such as that of ﬂoor plans or whole
buildings as found in Platenbau developments (Hopf and
Meier, 2011), repetitive sameness is criticised for being
monotonously boring or even socially detrimental. Aiming
at repeatable input–output relationships, early computer
applications in our ﬁeld focussed on predictable input–output
relationships, leading to criticisms of applying the computer
as a “fancy drawing board” (Dantas, 2010, p. 161) and of
valuing it as an equivalent to “an army of clerks” (Alexander,
1965). In architecture and in other industries, there are now
tendencies acting against monotonous sameness. Referred to
as customisation approaches (Gilmore et al., 1997), these
tendencies are increasingly aided by computational (genera-
tive, parametric etc.) techniques that allow increasing of
variety via circular feedback. The development of typogra-
phy follows a similar pattern. Moveable type introduced
economic beneﬁts along with monotonous sameness to
book printing. Using type wheels and the like, typewriters,Figure 3 Schematic diagram of Enigmteletypes and computer printers achieved similar predictable
sameness and cost-efﬁciency also in documents produced in
small numbers. Contextual variations such as ligatures have
been introduced to mechanical typesetting. Some contem-
porary computer typefaces go further and achieve “organic”,
“random” or “handwritten” appearances by introducing
randomness to curve paths or by providing sets of alternative
glyphs for the same characters.4. Enigma cipher machine
With these working principles, the NTM is essentially
isomorphous with the Enigma machine (Scherbius, 1928;
Fischer, 2012) which was used to encipher and to decipher
communications in Nazi Germany before and during World
War II (this relationship between NTM and Enigma machine
was previously suggested by Tessmann, 2008, p. 55). Looking
somewhat like a typewriter, the Enigma machine was used
to encrypt and to decrypt text messages by substituting
letters with a replacement mechanism that changes system-
atically as the machine is used. It takes its input via a
qwertz keyboard (label 1 in Figure 3) with typically 26 keys,
and offers its output via typically 26 lamps which are also
arranged in a qwertz layout (label 12 in Figure 3). Pressing
any key closes an electrical circuit which travels across a set
of cylindrical rotors each of which contains a different
irregularly-connected wiring, leading to the illumination of
a lamp with a different letter. Before it closes a circuit each
keystroke also results in the change of the internal state of
the machine by way of rotating one or more of the rotors by
one twenty-sixth of a full rotation so that the combined
irregular wiring changes for each letter that is enciphered
or deciphered. Additionally, a plug board allows the swap-
ping of pairs of letters using patch cables. Much like von
Foerster's NTM, the Enigma machine translates input char-
acters to output characters, with every translation resulting ina machine (from Scherbius, 1928).
T. Fischer372a re-mapping of the set of accepted input characters to the
set of available output characters. The Enigma machine
demonstrates that the NTM is implementable as a physical
device, which is very challenging to determine analytically
from the perspective of an external observer.
Pressing a key will activate one of the lamps, apparently at
random, according to selection of cylinders and their current
orientation. Additionally, each keystroke results in the rota-
tion of the ﬁrst cylinder by one of 26 rotation positions, after
26 keystrokes, the second cylinder will also rotate by one
position and so forth, somewhat in the fashion of the digit
cylinders in a mechanical odometer. Thus, each keystroke
results in a new wiring between keyboard and lamps coming
into effect for the subsequent keystroke. In other words: use
of the machine leaves a trace in it, changing the wiring of the
machine, and hence the cipher, progressively. (Due to the
symmetrical setup of the wiring going into the cylinders and
back out through the same cylinders, the same machine setup
can be used both to cipher and to decipher. The identical
setup is achieved by referring to a secret timetable based
code book of which both ends must hold a copy.) To an outside
observer the input-to-output mapping of the Enigma machine
is extremely difﬁcult to determine, while it is perfectly
determinable to those who developed it and who have a good
understanding of its setup and inner workings. With inner
workings of this kind the Enigma machine shares key char-
acteristics of designing, making it a useful metaphor for the
purpose of showing how designing is a relatively straight-
forward process when viewed from the inside perspective but
mysterious and wonderful when viewed from the outside
perspective.5. A typographical metaphor
The illustration presented here is a piece of software
predicated on the Enigma machine and implemented as a
VBA script controlling Rhino3D. Glyph renderings of char-
acters input via keyboard are distorted dynamically and
individually, with the use of a “private key” string stored
inside the system. Somewhat akin to the (de)ciphering
process of the Enigma machine, each key that is typed,
modelled, transformed and rendered changes the internal
state of the system (leaves a trace in it) to change the way
the following glyph is distorted. In contrast to common
computer typefaces, glyphs of same characters are unpre-
dictably variant. As a point of departure, the system uses
the typeface Helvetica to derive initial glyph outline curves
for each typed character. The system then applies aFigure 4 Fish transformations based on Thompson (1992,
pp. 1053–1093).combination of six (Thompson, 1992) transformations (see
Figure 5) to these outline curves.
Thompson transformations (parametric “warping” based
on quadratic functions, Wilkinson, 2005, pp. 223–224) as
illustrated in Figure 3 allow positive and negative transfor-
mations based on parameters P1–P10. Of these, the pre-
sented generative system uses the six parameters P1, P2,
P3, P6, P7 and P8. Parameters P4, P9 and P10 are ignored
while P5 can be toggled manually, providing an “italics”
option. Parametric input for the six Thompson transforma-
tions performed by the system is derived from the ASCII bit
patterns of characters of a “private key” string, which is
“rotated” by three characters with each input keystroke.
Any ASCII string of any length can be used for this purpose
(Figure 6).
Once a key is pressed, the ﬁrst three characters of the
“private key” string are converted to their respective ASCII bit
patterns and the six last bits of each are used to produce two
factors out of the set 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, which are
multiplied with a scaling factor (0.075 gives a good effect) to
produce a total of six parameters (see Figure 4).
Following parametric Thompson transformations, the
resulting glyph outline curves are simpliﬁed by reducing
their numbers of control points, resulting in casual looking,
“blobby” glyphs. These are variant with identical characters
being shown as different glyphs (see the bottom line of
Figure 7). Overall, the resulting types are nevertheless
largely consistent and recognisable as members of the same
typographical style, which I call Polymorph. The generative
system includes a rudimentary automatic kerning function,
the performance of which is also visible in the bottom line
of Figure 7. The top line of Figure 5 shows the typeface
Helvetica. The middle line shows the hand-drawn,
Helvetica-inspired typeface YWFT HLLVTKA Round, each
character of which looks irregular, while identical charac-
ters are rendered with the same glyphs.
Just as the Enigma machine's cipher output is enigmatic and
unpredictable to outsiders such as wartime enemies, the glyph
transformations generated by the described system are unlikely
to be predictable to outsiders of the system. Nevertheless, both
systems are perfectly determinable and appear straight-
forward to those aware of both systems' setups and of the
ways in which the performances of both systems leave traces
within them, changing their internal states, thus in effect
leading to new inner workings with each operation. Designers,
articulating and (re-)considering ideas can be seen as embody-
ing a similar, non-trivial re-entry structure which, similarly, can
appear either surprising and unpredictable or straight-forward
and traceable depending on an observer's inside or outside
perspective.6. Observations
Some processes are linear, predictable and seem causal
while others involve circularity appear unpredictable. The
difference can be shown with the distinction between the
trivial machine and the non-trivial machine. Like the
Enigma machine, instances of designing can be viewed as
circular systems (Glanville, 1992; Fischer, 2010; Gänshirt,
2011, p. 79) which display the structure and quality of the
non-trivial machine. It was demonstrated here that circular
Figure 5 Quadratic functions and Thompson transformations based on parametric variation.
Figure 6 Key operations of glyph-variation based on “private key” string.
Figure 7 Helvetica (top), YWFT HLLVTKA round (middle) and
polymorph (bottom).
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sufﬁcient condition of indeterminability, and for systems
characterised by circular re-entry to transcend the narrow
notion of linear cause and effect typically applied to
(digital) technology and natural-scientiﬁc research. The
wonder and surprise offered by indeterminable systems
depend on their interior workings evading observation
(Fischer, 2008). Design is, on the inside, concerned with
what is unpredictable to outsiders. It hence corresponds to
the non-trivial machine. Science, always on the outside, is
concerned with prediction and hence corresponds to thetrivial machine. This poses a challenge to scientiﬁc
researchers aiming to research into designing objectively,
somewhat comparable to the challenge of cryptography
that leaves outsiders mystiﬁed while insiders understand.
Design processes can be appreciated and understood on the
subjective inside. Objective scientiﬁc description, though,
is required to approach design from the outside.
Von Foerster's TM, his NTM, and the Enigma machine
share the trait that, the question of predictability notwith-
standing, the varieties of acceptable inputs, of available
internal states, and of their sets of possible outputs is
predeﬁned by the makeup of the machine in question.
These varieties are ﬁnite and do not change through the
machines operations. The Enigma machine, for example,
can neither be expected to cope with unforeseen inputs
that are not supported in its set of acceptable input
characters, nor to spontaneously transcend its set of avail-
able outputs to include for example Chinese characters,
T. Fischer374let alone previously unknown characters. Similarly, neither
the NTM, nor the TM, can be expected to accept and to
process inputs other than those these machines were set up
to accept and to process or to offer outputs other than
those they were designed to offer.
The human mind is different in this respect (and obviously
in other respects, too1). It has the capability of accepting
previously not accepted inputs, and of expressions beyond
the range of expected outputs as illustrated by the state-
ment “2  2=grün”. More overtly, nonetheless evident in
human learning, the mind also modulates its repertoire of
internal attitudes towards inputs it encounters, i.e. its
range of internal states. In other words, our nervous system
has the capability of amplifying the variety of ranges of
inputs it accepts, of its internal states, and of outputs it can
be expected to offer. The TM's, the NTM's and the Enigma
machine's clearly speciﬁed, constant input, internal state,
and output varieties are typical of digital technology
(Fischer, 2011), which is developed and used precisely
for the predictable control it offers, at the expense, as
Glanville (2009, p. 119) argues, of variety. Fixes varieties in
technical systems are established by a kind of observer
(matchmaker) who intentionally brings system together to
serve purposes by way of control (Fischer, 2011). The human
mind, in contrast, can actively modulate these varieties. It
can, for instance, refuse to answer a yes-or-no question in
those terms or answer an arithmetic problem by naming a
colour. Giving a human an arithmetic problem to solve
implicitly aims to reduce that humans input and output
variety to the language of arithmetic and numbers within
which a response may then be evaluated. A humans
concession to answer in terms of mathematics and numbers
constitutes a reduction of that humans output variety. A
surprising (i.e. substantially or formally incorrect) answer
will then likely be dismissed as wrong, regardless of whether
the contemplations that led to it have value. On such
grounds Dostoyevsky's (2009, p. 25) underground man can
be dismissed when he states: “I admit that twice two makes
four is an excellent thing, but if we are to give everything
its due, twice two makes ﬁve is sometimes a very charming
thing too.”
Drawing a mutually-exclusive distinction between the
trivial and the non-trivial, however, von Foerster places
both his mechanistic and his anthropomorphic portrayal of
non-triviality in the same category, suggesting that humans
are a subset of, and hence isomorphous with, non-trivial
machines. While the human nervous system and non-trivial
mechanisms share some characteristics, they are set apart
by others, rendering them not isomorphous. Mechanistic
systems such as the Enigma machine, most critically, do not
share the human capability to reduce and to amplify the
variety of ranges of accepted inputs, of internal states,
and of expectable outputs (to make new and to drop old
distinctions). As a model for human inventiveness von
Foersters mechanistic description of the NTM is therefore
crude at best.
While at a theoretical level the argument presented here
shines a critical light on those instances where design and1Obviously the differences between simple hypothetical or phy-
sical mechanisms and the human nervous system with all its
complexity and subtlety are vast.design research are approached in terms of purely linear
cause and effect, it also offers a path forward for future
research into digital design tools and computational crea-
tivity: reduction and ampliﬁcation of input and output
channel variety are well within the scope of technical
implementability (consider digital sound or image input
and output based on different sampling rates and resolu-
tions). As a next step in the presented line of enquiry, the
potential of changing input and output channel variety in
systems allowing for circular re-entry will be investigated
with regards to the potential for novelty generation.References
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